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BENEFICIARIES’ OUT-OF-POCKET COSTS UNDER THE
MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT: EVIDENCE FROM
MEDICARE DISCOUNT DRUG CARD CLAIMS DATA
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1Mathematica Policy Research, Inc, Princeton, NJ, USA, 2Caremark,
Hunt Valley, MD, USA
OBJECTIVES: To investigate the potential impact of the stan-
dard Medicare prescription drug beneﬁt on beneﬁciaries who are
high utilizers and on beneﬁciaries who qualiﬁed for the Transi-
tional Assistance Program (TAP). METHODS: Simulation of
annual beneﬁciary out-of-pocket costs under the standard pre-
scription beneﬁt using Medicare discount card claims data for
37,425 enrolled beneﬁciaries (at least 6 months) who ﬁlled at
least one prescription between June 2004 and November 2005.
The results of this study should closely represent Medicare ben-
eﬁciaries’ drug using behavior as these data are more accurate
than self-reported or survey data. RESULTS: Annually, beneﬁ-
ciaries ﬁlled 19 prescriptions, on average, and had out-of-pocket
costs of $538. Average out-of-pocket costs among the top quar-
tile of utilizers (more than 26 ﬁlls annually) were $1155. Assum-
ing ﬁxed drug utilization patterns, simulated Part D costs
demonstrate that all beneﬁciaries would spend $412 out-of-
pocket (excluding premiums), on average, while high utilizers
would spend $779. Among high utilizers, 22% would have
greater than $2250 in total drug costs and fall into the beneﬁt’s
“doughnut hole.” TAP beneﬁciaries (46%) would have higher
out-of-pocket costs under Part D then under the drug card ($429
versus $256; p < 0.001), on average, because Medicare subsi-
dized their ﬁrst $600 in drug card ﬁlls annually. Under the drug
card, TAP beneﬁciaries ﬁlled more prescriptions (23 versus 15;
p < 0.001) and had lower out-of-pocket costs ($256 versus $781;
p < 0.001) annually than non-TAP beneﬁciaries. CONCLU-
SION: Out-of-pocket costs under Part D for TAP beneﬁciaries
and high utilizers (more than two prescriptions monthly) would
be more than $400 and $750, respectively. If TAP beneﬁciaries
do not qualify subsidized coverage under Part D and their drug
use remains ﬁxed, their out-of-pocket costs will increase. Bene-
ﬁciaries might reduce their utilization when faced with higher
out-of-pocket costs, with the potential for adverse impacts on
patients’ health.
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OBJECTIVES: Recent Medicare legislation calls on AHRQ to
conduct research related to the comparative effectiveness of
health care items and services, including prescription drugs. This
reinforces earlier calls for “practical clinical trials” involving
clinically relevant treatment alternatives. We explored the 
decision of pharmaceutical companies to conduct such “head-to-
head” comparative trials. Our objectives were to: 1). better
understand the incentives and disincentives to conduct a com-
parative trial; 2). shed light on the hidden costs of a trial; 
3). characterize the conditions under which a trial will be 
undertaken; and 4). identify implications for public policy.
METHODS: In the context of a differentiated products oligop-
oly, we modeled a one-stage game involving two risk-neutral
pharmaceutical companies, each of which simultaneously
decides whether or not to conduct a head-to-head trial involv-
ing a direct comparison between its drug and that of the other
company. RESULTS: Our model suggests that an important
factor affecting a ﬁrm’s decision is the potential loss in market
share following a result of inferiority or comparability. This
“hidden cost” is higher for the Market Leader than the Market
Follower, making it less likely that the Leader will choose 
to conduct a trial. The model also suggests that in a full-
information environment it will never be the case that both ﬁrms
choose to conduct such a trial. Furthermore, if market shares
and the probability of proving superiority are similar for both
ﬁrms, it is quite possible that neither ﬁrm will choose to conduct
a trial. Finally, our results indicate that incentives that offset the
direct cost of a trial can prevent a “no-trial equilibrium”, even
when both ﬁrms face the possibility of an inferior outcome.
CONCLUSIONS: The generation of comparative information
through the conduct of clinical trials depends greatly on private
incentives, which may be subject to alteration through public
policy.
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OBJECTIVE: To assess British Columbian (BC) physicians’ opin-
ions regarding reference drug programs (RDPs) and generic 
substitution programs (GSPs). METHODS: 208 telephone inter-
views on the economic and clinical appropriateness of RDPs and
GSPs were conducted with BC general practitioners. Responses
were rated on 5-point Likert scales: 1 = very inappropriate and
5 = very appropriate. Responses to questions on the economic
appropriateness were stratiﬁed by physicians’ understanding of
drug costs measured by estimating costs of a 30-day supply of
atorvastatin within ±$10 of the actual cost. RESULTS: Physi-
cians regarded both the clinical and economic appropriateness
of GSPs as greater than that of RDPs (p < 0.01). The rating of
clinical appropriateness of RDPs was signiﬁcantly correlated
with the rating of the therapeutic equivalence of ACE inhibitors
(p = 0.034) and calcium channel blockers (p = 0.019). This result
was independent of whether the RDP or a therapeutic equiva-
lence question was asked ﬁrst. Physicians signiﬁcantly underes-
timated the costs for a 30-day supply of two drugs: $28 (33%)
for omeprazole and $28 (34%) for atorvastatin. Physicians
whose cost estimates for atorvastatin were accurate were signif-
icantly less likely to consider RDPs (p = 0.003) and GSPs (p =
0.026) as economically appropriate than were those whose esti-
mates were inaccurate. CONCLUSIONS: BC physicians were
more comfortable with the clinical and economic appropriate-
ness of GSPs than with RDPs. While there is great agreement
between physicians’ opinions towards RDP and their assessment
of therapeutic equivalence within drug classes, similar agreement
does not exist between GSPs or RDPs and the accuracy of physi-
